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 One of my colleagues describes language as the opening through which the law 
discloses itself to us.
I. Introduction 
1 If this is so, the opening is rarely clear. As Iris Murdoch wrote, "we 
can no longer take language for granted as a medium for communication. Its transparency 
is gone. We are like people who for a long time looked out of a window without noticing 
the glass—and then one day began to notice this too."2
 Metaphor is an apt vehicle for examining the relationship between law and 
language, and not only because metaphors are ubiquitous in law. In metaphor, the speaker 
has quite clearly said one thing and the listener has most likely understood that she meant 
another. Metaphor is thus effective rhetorically, though a non-literal use of language. 
Perhaps as a result, philosophy and law have a shared history of disdain for metaphor: 
 
metaphor “openly professes deceit”; it “move(s) the passions and thereby mislead(s) the 
judgment”;3 once used, a metaphor becomes not only “a literal truth but the literal truth, a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.”4
My argument in this essay is that although lawyers routinely use and abuse 
metaphor as propositional language, they mostly neglect the use of metaphor as poetic 
language. Poetic metaphor openly invites you to view a topic or a target from a new angle 
by setting it against or alongside a light source; in this way, it prompts second looks and 
encourages insights. Propositional metaphor, by comparison, appears designed to 
persuade you to view the target or the topic under discussion as something you already 
know about because of your experience with the source. As a result, you are better able to 
understand or to “handle” the topic, but you discover little that is new.  
 
 The prototypical poetic metaphor is Juliet is the sun. The capacity to create and 
express metaphors like this one is claimed to be the source of eloquence: “Eloquence lies 
in the unbound mental capacity to perceive similarity where it may not appear.”5
 A quintessential propositional metaphor is that the corporation is a person 
competing within a marketplace of ideas.
 Poetic 
metaphor evokes the senses and conjures up images and emotions; it thus seems 
suggestively open-ended. Poetic metaphor leaves us hanging. 
6 This conceptual metaphor is the now-
conventional foundation of a newly controversial line of authority in U.S. judicial 
decision making.7 The basic propositions being asserted are that the corporation should 
be treated as a living entity, rather than as a mechanism or artificial creation, and that a 
corporation’s spending of money to participate in the political or commercial arenas of 
expression should be seen as the "speech” of a person and protected from undue 
governmental regulation. When successful, as these have been, propositional metaphors 
are processed like literal speech: no one notices they are metaphors until problems occur. 
Rather than leaving us wondering, they shut the door and turn out the light. 
 Although I have just described a metaphor as propositional, metaphor theorists are 
divided on the question of whether metaphor is capable of carrying propositional content. 
Pragmatists contend that the speaker of a metaphorical sentence “makes as if to say” a 
distinct propositional content
II. What Are Metaphor’s Effects? How Does Metaphor Work? 
8 while non-cognitivist theorists contend that metaphor 
produces only non-propositional shifts of perspective.9  
As already noted, the poetic power of metaphor arises from its invitation to see 
one thing “as another,” providing us with a novel perspective and generating new 
information in the process. We don’t see Juliet “as” the sun. But something happens in 
our thinking that is similar to our viewing the figure in which, depending on your 
perspective, one of two different women seems to appear. The figure always contains the 
elements of both a young woman and an old woman and that does not change, but the 
elements slip and slide before our eyes until they click into place. Although we now see 
something we did not see before, it is not because we have received new information: 
“Rather, the difference is experiential, intuitive, and holistic.”
A. The Effects of Metaphor  
10
 Theorists who focus on poetic metaphor may conclude that metaphor carries no 
cognitive content that was intended by the speaker. Instead, a metaphor is “like a picture 
or a bump on the head” that works by “prompting,” “inspiring,” “provoking or inviting” 
us to appreciate some feature of a target in contrast with a source. Metaphors are like 
  
“scraps of poetry which send shivers down our spine”; they “do not (literally) tell us 
anything, but they do make us notice things. . . . They do not have cognitive content, but 
they are responsible for a lot of cognitions.” 11
Contextualists, on the other hand, concentrate on more conventional, so-called 
conceptual metaphors, such as life is a journey. They argue that we understand these 
statements as if they were making propositional assertions. The speaker intends for the 
listener to figure out what is meant and to do so because the listener knows, more or less, 
what meaning the speaker intended. If challenged, the speaker is expected to respond 
with a more explicit statement of the proposition that was meant. Within any given 
context, speakers and hearers can usually find common ground about the gist of what the 
speaker said.
 
12
 Perhaps the most well known of metaphor theorists, George Lakoff & Mark 
Johnson, a linguist and a philosopher, argued not only that metaphor creates cognitive 
content, but also that metaphor is fundamental to thought and expression.
  
13 They were 
persuaded by their research that metaphor is absorbed through long, constant, and 
unconscious experience. The resulting conceptual metaphors provide tacit knowledge, 
knowledge that has become embedded through unavoidable and repeated experience.14
 Critics of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor dispute their 
overarching claim that metaphor is the fundamental feature of thought.
 
Lakoff and Johnson’s research focused on the use of a concrete, experienced source 
domain to structure and understand a more abstract target domain. They suggested that 
experts were able to solve problems by recognizing patterns and retrieving solutions from 
a stored repertoire acquired by encountering similar problems in the past.  
15 These critics 
point out that metaphor is not the only language process that works in a similar way. 
Other stored knowledge structures—including schema, analogy, and narrative—also 
create new meaning by mapping the source domain on top of the target or by transferring 
features from the source to the target. Some additional doubt has been cast on the 
argument that all thinking is fundamentally metaphorical by studies showing that 
unfamiliar and novel metaphors take longer to process than literal sentences.16 
Rather than competing with one another, models of metaphorical processing may 
fall along a spectrum that describes different kinds of metaphors. Like Aristotle, 
cognitive researchers believe that “comparison is the fundamental process that drives 
metaphor.” Moreover, they conclude that “[n]ovel metaphors are understood only by 
comparison. Conventional metaphors can be understood by accessing stored abstractions, 
but these metaphoric abstractions are a product of past comparisons.”
B. Models of the Metaphorical Process  
17
The traditional model of juxtaposition suggested that metaphor works by 
contrasting the target (Juliet) with the source (that is, with any another object, event, or 
situation, like the sun). The juxtaposition was thought to nudge us to attend to previously 
un-noticed features of the target. This model, however, failed to explain how metaphors 
could generate new information.
   
18
“Category-transfer” models proposed that metaphor works by forming ad hoc 
categories, abstracting from a prototype of the source, and then transferring to the target. 
When we think of life as a journey, we derive abstract categories from the concrete 
features of a journey to produce a more general schema for understanding life. Category-
transfer models explained why metaphor can help organize our understanding of an 
  
unfamiliar target, but they did not account for the different effects of applying the same 
source to different targets. (Camp, 162-63) In contrast to the category-transfer model, the 
“feature-matching” model aligned the source and the target and directly compared their 
features. The feature-matching model could not, however, explain some of metaphor’s 
broader organizational effects or how metaphors created new information. (Camp, 163-
64) 
 An emerging consensus by cognitive scientists surrounds a hybrid model that 
grew out of studies of analogy, the “structural alignment” model. This model incorporates 
alignment and projection. First, a relevant analogy or metaphor is accessed from long-
term memory. The processor then begins mapping the source onto the target to identify 
matches and align the corresponding parts of the target and the source. The mapping 
allows analogical inferences to be made about the target, creating new knowledge to fill 
in gaps. The inferences are evaluated and adapted if needed. As a result, new categories 
and schemas may be generated.19 For analogies, the model showed that the most 
important similarities were found in the relationships within the domains rather than in 
the features of those domains.20 Dedre Gentner and her co-authors have concluded that 
the same “basic processes of analogy are at work in metaphor . . . structural alignment, 
inference projection, progressive abstraction, and re-representation.”21  
 This section draws primarily on the work of Elisabeth Camp, a philosopher of 
language.
III. The Imaginative Power of Metaphor  
22 Camp concludes that metaphor sometimes enables speakers to communicate 
things that cannot be fully expressed in literal terms and that metaphor sometimes 
provides “our only cognitive access to certain properties.”23 In Camp’s view, the 
distinctive feature of metaphor is that it reveals an overall perspective. Perspectives 
“provide us with a tool for thinking rather than a thought per se.”24
 Metaphor accomplishes this through a process involving characterizations, 
aspectual thinking, and perspectives.
 Because of 
perspectives, metaphor can go beyond highlighting new and surprising features of the 
things that exist in the world, “[it] can also tell us that things are a certain way.” (Camp, 
13) 
25
In Camp’s theory, one characterization is used as an aspect, to filter, frame, or 
structure another. So I might use my characterization of the lioness to structure my 
characterization of Angela Merkel, the German chancellor. This process would begin 
 A characterization is a collection of properties and 
attributes possessed by the person or thing being characterized, structured so that some of 
them are more central and others are more prominent. When it comes in the form of a 
stereotype or prototype, a characterization may be “ready made,” consisting of properties 
and characteristics we intuitively associate with the person or thing because of prior 
characterizations. But we also are able to narratively construct new and individual 
characterizations. My characterization of a lioness might include the appearance features 
of a muscular body and soft, large paws; the characteristics and qualities of being quiet 
and watchful while sitting, slow and imperious while walking, fast and deadly while 
hunting. In addition to such general attributes, my characterization might include more 
specific properties that apply in certain circumstances: thus, I might characterize the 
lioness as being painstaking, patient, and serious when teaching her cubs. Some 
properties of a characterization affect how we feel about the subject: describing the 
lioness as a hunter and protector may stir feelings of endangerment and respect. 
with the most prominent and central features in the framing characterization (the lioness), 
seek matches for them within the subject characterization (Merkel), and then highlight 
the prominence and centrality of the matched features. Restructuring one characterization 
in light of another appears intuitive: if it works, you will come to “see” Merkel as a 
lioness without knowing how your insight came about.  
 Perspectives have the same effect at a higher level of generality: they are more 
general modes of interpretation and are not tied to a particular subject. “[A] perspective 
provides an intuitive, holistic principle for organizing our thoughts about some topic” 
around “a complex structure of relative prominence . . . so that some features stick out in 
our minds while others fade into the background, and by making some features especially 
central to explain others.” 26 For instance, a perspective might be a political orientation or 
a general worldview that individuals are responsible for helping themselves. As these 
examples illustrate, a perspective may carry attitudes, emotions, and values. Rather than a 
complete, complex thought, a perspective provides a tool for thinking that “helps us to do 
things with the thoughts we have: to make quick judgments based on what’s most 
important, to grasp intuitive connections, and to respond emotionally.” Perspective also 
“provides us with a ‘way to go on,’ incorporating new thoughts about the focal topic and 
often about related topics as well.” 
 Thus, according to Camp, the process of metaphorically “seeing as” is not a what 
but a how. Rather than changing what exists, “[i]t imaginatively alters how we structure 
and color our thoughts about what is so.” Seeing a target through a characterization 
requires the viewer to re-structure her thinking to make the relevant features play an 
appropriately prominent or central role. Trying on a perspective requires the viewer to re-
(Camp, 111)  
configure her patterns of thought about a broader collection of topics. (Camp, 111-16) 
 For those engaged in legal persuasion, poetic metaphor supports the intuition that 
there may be more effective “ways of changing someone’s mind than changing his or her 
beliefs.” What we are after is not so much different beliefs, but “changes in the 
associations and comparisons one makes, differences in the vivid or ‘felt’ appreciation of 
something already known, or changes in one’s habits of attention and sense of the 
important and the trifling.”
IV. Applying Metaphor’s Imaginative Power to Law  
27 These changes and differences—dependent on thoughts, 
images, and feelings—may fall within metaphor’s power.28
 To illustrate the power of “seeing as” in legal argument, following are examples 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 decision upholding federal power to regulate 
immigration and striking down major portions of an Arizona statute.
  
29 In his opinion for 
the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy describes the United States as a nation of 
immigrants, but this is not the important metaphor. He characterizes the power of 
“Government of the United States” with regard to immigration as “broad [and] 
undoubted,” resting not only on the Constitution but also on the inherent power of a 
national sovereign to conduct relations with foreign nations.30
 
 He depicts a national 
government that exercises its significant power with the restraint and discretion necessary 
when human concerns are immediately at stake: 
 The National Government has significant power to regulate 
immigration. With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of 
national power over immigration depends on the Nation’s meeting its 
responsibility to base its laws on a political will informed by searching, 
thoughtful, rational civic discourse. Arizona may have understandable 
frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration while that 
process continues, but the State may not pursue policies that undermine 
federal law. 
 
 This characterization of the national government, its power, and its restraint is the 
lens through which Arizona’s law may be seen as undermining federal law. From a larger 
perspective, Justice Kennedy views the United States as a member of the international 
community of nations.31
 In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Antonin Scalia 
proposes a different metaphor:  
 Trying on this perspective, an audience might re-align its 
patterns of thought even if Justice Kennedy did not explicitly state the proposition that 
only the national sovereign has the power to control and conduct relations with foreign 
nations.  
 
 The United States is an indivisible “Union of sovereign States.” 
Today’s opinion, approving virtually all of the Ninth Circuit’s injunction 
against enforcement of the four challenged provisions of Arizona’s law, 
deprives States of what most would consider the defining characteristic of 
sovereignty: the power to exclude from the sovereign’s territory people 
who have no right to be there.32
 
 
These characterizations accord prominence and centrality to the sovereign character of 
the States, and they make the central feature of sovereignty the power “to forbid the 
entrance of foreigners.”33
 Justice Scalia describes the “human realities” this way: “Arizona bears the brunt 
of the country’s illegal immigration problem. Its citizens feel themselves under siege by 
large number of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social services 
and even place their lives in jeopardy.”
  
34
 
 But this is not the only danger: 
the specter that Arizona and the States that support it predicted [has come 
to pass]: A Federal Government that does not want to enforce the 
immigration laws as written, and leaves the States’ borders unprotected 
against immigrants whom those laws would exclude. So the issue is a 
stark one. Are the sovereign States at the mercy of the Federal Executive’s 
refusal to enforce the Nation’s immigration laws?35
 
 
Through the filter provided by Justice Scalia’s characterizations, Arizona’s legislation is 
seen as warranted. Trying on his overall perspective that the States have always had the 
authority to protect themselves from foreign invasion, an audience might adjust its 
thinking to conclude that left unprotected, Arizona must have authority to act. 
  Because lawyers distrust intuition and imagination, metaphor’s poetic power may 
be overlooked in favor of apparently more rational persuasive methods. But “[i]f we 
insist upon confining ourselves to scrupulously rational modes of thought and discussion, 
. . . this may well have the effect of granting inappropriate influence to pre-existing biases 
. . . . Against this, harnessing the power of imagination to reconfigure our thought by 
more intuitive means may enable us to counteract these biases in a more thoroughgoing 
way.”36
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